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Monetary policy implications of central 
bank-issued digital currency
This article analyses the concept of digital currency issuable by a central bank, highlighting 
its similarities to and differences from the two main liabilities on its balance sheet: cash and 
bank reserves. It also discusses the main reasons why some central banks are looking into 
the potential consequences of the introduction of this new instrument. Lastly, it considers 
different central bank digital currency alternatives and highlights some of the possible 
implications for monetary policy conduct and for financial stability.
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The decline in the use of cash in some countries owing to the growing popularisation of 
private digital means of payment (cards, mobile payments, etc.), combined with 
technological innovations and the development of the so-called “cryptocurrencies” 
(Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.), has elicited debate on whether central banks – which already 
issue a public means of payment in the form of a physical instrument, namely banknotes 
– should adapt to this growing demand for digital payment services and issue their own 
digital currency. Some central banks, such as the Bank of England, the People’s Bank of 
China and the Riksbank (Bank of Sweden), have – strictly from a theoretical standpoint – 
considered this possibility. 
Issuing a digital means of payment would entail extending the possibility – available at present 
to credit institutions and the public sector – of holding deposits at the central bank to all other 
economic agents: other non-bank, non-financial corporations and households. This possibility 
poses, in turn, several technical alternatives: whether the digital money should be remunerated 
(like the public’s deposits at banks) or not (like cash); and whether it should observe the 
anonymity that cash ensures or be in registered form (like bank deposits). 
Advocates of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) claim it would both improve aspects of 
the functioning of the payment system and, potentially, the transmission of monetary policy.1 
Detractors, for their part, consider that the benefits for monetary policy transmission associated 
with CBDC are modest and that the technological risks and the risks to financial stability mean 
due caution is required.2 As analysed below, the possible advantages and disadvantages of 
CBDC hinge crucially on the design choice, in particular on the two aforementioned aspects: 
potential anonymity and the possibility of this type of currency being remunerated.  
This article analyses the concept of CBDC, highlighting its similarities to and differences from 
the two main central bank liabilities: banknotes and bank reserves. There is also discussion 
of the main reasons why some central banks are considering the possible introduction of this 
new instrument, along with some of the forms it may take. Lastly, the article analyses some of 
the potential implications for monetary policy conduct and for financial stability.3 
Central banks currently issue two main types of liability that may be classified as “money”: 
bank reserves and banknotes (see Table 1). Bank reserves are the deposits that a relatively 
small group of financial institutions (credit institutions) hold at the central bank, either for 
regulatory and monetary policy (required reserves) reasons, or for liquidity management 
purposes (excess reserves). The reserves have no physical format, but are solely 
accounting entries between the central bank and the commercial banks. They are 
restricted-access, registered and potentially remunerated digital assets.4 In the Eurosystem, 
bank reserves (above the minimum obligatory reserves) are currently remunerated at 
the deposit facility rate, this being one of the main monetary policy instruments of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). 
Introduction
What is CBDC?
1  See Bordo and Levin (2017).
2  See Siciliani (2018) and BIS (2018a).
3  Recently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has published a report on cryptocurrencies that also 
analyses the possibility of CBDC [see BIS (2018b)].
4  The central bank’s liabilities are assets for the rest of the agents in the economy.
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Banknotes, for their part, are physical, non-registered assets that can be used by any 
person to make payments anonymously, without even having to be a citizen of the area 
or region in which this currency is deemed to be legal tender. Naturally, banknotes are 
not remunerated. They are, therefore, physical, universal, anonymous and non-
remunerated assets.5
CBDC is typically conceived as a deposit at the central bank available to households and 
firms.6 Consequently, CBDC shares characteristics with banknotes and bank reserves. 
Regarding anonymity and remuneration, various possibilities are envisaged, which will be 
discussed below. This system may or may not be anonymous (as in the respective cases 
of banknotes and bank reserves). Likewise, CBDC may or may not be remunerated. 
CBDC also shares characteristics with private digital money, represented by accounting 
entries in agents’ current accounts, which can be mobilised without the need for the use 
of banknotes, for instance through bank transfers or debit cards. The main difference is 
that CBDC is a public digital currency, issued by the central bank. 
The recent literature has indicated three main reasons why some central banks might 
consider the future introduction of CBDC:7 i) the lesser demand for cash in some jurisdictions; 
ii) possible improvements in some aspects of the workings of the payment system, and iii) 
potential improvements in monetary policy transmission. Moreover, in many of the countries 
in which the introduction of the CBDC is being considered, regard is also had to other more 
general aspects of economic policy, such as combating tax fraud and money-laundering, 
and financial inclusion. Each of these reasons are analysed below in greater detail.
One reason for issuing CBDC might be the impact that a potential replacement of cash with 
digital means of payment might have on seigniorage, i.e. the profit the central bank obtains 
on the issuance of banknotes, whose production cost is small compared with their face 
value. Insofar as the central bank’s profits are transferred to the Treasury, that would cause 
a decline in public sector revenue, potentially giving rise to tax increases or reductions in 
public spending. However, the amount of banknotes in circulation remains on a growing 
course in most economies, including the euro area (see Chart 1).8 Accordingly, this reason 
does not appear currently to justify the issuance of CBDC in most advanced economies. 
What might warrant the 
issuance of CBDC?
CDBCsetonknaBsevreseR
latigiDlacisyhPlatigiDtamroF
lasrevinUlasrevinUdetcirtseRsseccA
elbissop htoBsuomynonAsuomynona-noNytimynonA
elbissop htoBoNseYdetarenumeR
SOURCE: Banco de España.
COMPARISON BETWEEN RESERVES, BANKNOTES AND CBDC TABLE 1
5  The concept of “universal” refers to the possibility of their use by whatsoever agent, i.e. the fact of not being 
confined to a certain type of agent, as in the case of bank reserves.
6  Although proposals for non-universal CBDC have been made, in that case we would be talking more about an 
increase in counterparties with access to central bank facilities than about digital currency. This is a relevant 
matter in terms of monetary policy conduct, but one too far removed from matters relating to the concept of 
CBDC discussed here.
7  See Bech and Garrat (2017).
8  Sweden is an exception to this broad pattern, since the bank notes in circulation there have been declining 
for a decade.
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Secondly, some studies conclude that the introduction of CBDC might improve certain 
aspects of the functioning of payment systems. Recent analyses estimate considerable 
gains in productivity associated with the introduction of CBDC.9 However, it is not clear why 
these improvements should arise necessarily from the introduction of public digital currency 
and not from the extension and improvement of current private digital currency (transfer 
payments, etc.). 
The third reason is the potential improvement in monetary policy transmission.10 Firstly, 
if CBDC were remunerated, its interest rate would become a key instrument for 
implementing conventional monetary policy, since it would affect household and 
corporate saving and investment decisions, either directly (through the remuneration of 
funds deposited at the central bank) or indirectly (by setting a lower bound on the 
remuneration of bank deposits). That would enable monetary policy transmission to be 
decoupled in part from banks’ financial situation, which might prove particularly 
important during financial crises. 
Further, if cash were eliminated, that would see the disappearance of the main reason 
justifying the existence of the so-called zero lower bound, which refers to the difficulty 
financial institutions face in setting negative remunerations on retail bank deposits, since 
in that case agents might withdraw their funds and save through the accumulation of 
banknotes.11 That sets a limit on the possible expansionary stance of monetary policy in 
an environment of low interest rates. Conversely, in the case of an economy without 
physical banknotes, the CBDC interest rate would mark the floor on interest rates. That 
would break the current asymmetry in monetary policy due to the existence of the zero 
lower bound, allowing, in principle, bigger cuts in nominal rates if necessary.12
SOURCES: Bank of England, Bank of Sweden, Datastream and ECB.
a Japan: expressed in trillions.
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9  See Barrdear and Kumhof (2016).
10  See, for example, Haldane (2015), Rogoff (2017), Bordo and Levin (2017) or Meaning et al. (2018).
11  Actually, the costs associated with banknote storage (space, security, etc.) mean that these rates may be 
slightly below zero, but they cannot be arbitrarily negative. 
12  By “asymmetry of monetary policy” we understand the fact that the central bank may increase interest rates 
by as much it wishes to combat inflationary pressures, but it cannot reduce them far below zero if there are 
deflationary pressures.
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In addition, the CBDC might be conducive to other economic policy goals, such as 
combating financial exclusion and tax fraud.13 In the case of the fight against tax fraud and 
money-laundering, it should be highlighted that the CBDC can play a significant role 
provided that holdings thereof are not anonymous, i.e. when the central bank maintains an 
active register of all transactions in the economy. Nonetheless, the attainment of such an 
objective would further require that the use of cash be eliminated so as to prevent it from 
being the vehicle used for illegal activities. However, in addition to the various and 
numerous challenges that a hypothetical introduction of non-anonymous public money 
would entail, the progressive replacement of banknotes by non-anonymous CBDC would 
not – far from it – mark an end to such activities. Illicit activities would still have alternative 
assets for such ends, such as other countries’ currencies, gold or cryptocurrencies 
themselves. 
The emergence of cryptocurrencies has caused some concern among certain analysts, 
inasmuch as the digital currencies become accepted and ultimately crowd out legal tender. 
Where this is the case, central banks would lose some control over monetary policy 
transmission to the real economy, which might entail serious consequences in respect of 
price stability.14 
At present, however, this reason is a very weak one for justifying the issuance of public 
digital currency, given that the market value of cryptocurrencies is tiny compared with the 
monetary aggregates in the euro area or in the United States, and their use as a means of 
exchange is very limited. This is due, among other matters, to the fact that, as explained 
in Box 1, while cryptocurrencies were originally conceived as alternative means of 
exchange, the forceful volatility frequently characterising their valuations makes them 
rather inappropriate as a unit of currency or a store of value.15 
The possibility of setting CBDC in place through registered deposits would entail a change 
compared with the current use of cash, which is anonymous. Although registered money 
can offer certain advantages to society (in areas such as combating tax evasion or money-
laundering), it would also involve a loss of individual privacy. 
Beyond the attendant sociological considerations, it is important to bear in mind that the 
decision to introduce public, non-anonymous digital currency would oblige the central 
bank to invest significantly in infrastructure that were equivalent or even superior to that 
currently deployed by electronic means of payment operators. Specifically, the central 
bank would have to validate each transaction in the economy at each point in time, 
ensuring the safety of the system against multifarious threats.
In the case of anonymous public currency, while the investment in infrastructure might be 
less, other technological problems arise. Anonymous CBDC might require adapting the 
current decentralised validation technology used by cryptocurrencies to a legal tender 
currency. This poses two challenges. First, it adds costs associated with this system 
whose calibration is a priori uncertain. Second, the system must be robust to cyber-attacks 
Anonymous or non-
anonymous money 
13  In the case of household financial inclusion, recent studies show how the use of CBDC would be beneficial to 
low-income households, which usually depend more on cash. See, for example, He et al. (2017).
14  See, for example, Bordo and Levin (2017) or Fernández Villaverde and Saches (2016), who show how in an 
economy without public money there may be problems of price level indeterminacy, which would be resolved 
with the introduction of CBDC.
15  It is not clear that CBDC could compete with the current cryptocurrencies. The main attractiveness of the latter 
for many investors is precisely the fact that their supply is not subject to any central bank discretionality. Hence, 
the argument on cryptocurrency competition seems insufficient to warrant the introduction of CBDC. 
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and fraud. That may prove complicated, based as it is on a relatively unconsolidated 
technology such as that of the cryptocurrencies. 
As earlier stated, the introduction of CBDC might have significant effects on monetary 
policy transmission. In this respect, the hypothetical scenario most closely in line with the 
current design would be the introduction of non-remunerated CBDC.16 Here, the 
remuneration of commercial banks’ reserves at the central bank would continue to mark 
the floor for short-term interest rates in the interbank market, a key variable in the 
transmission of monetary policy decisions.
Remunerated CBDC would be something more of a novelty. Confining ourselves to the 
case where such remuneration were never higher than that on bank reserves, the latter 
would continue to be the floor for short-term interbank yields. However, given that the 
CBDC is an alternative to current accounts as a store of value and a means of payment, 
the remuneration thereon would indeed be an effective floor for the rates at which the 
different economic agents with access to CBDC lent funds to banks. For example, 
giving access to CBDC to non-bank financial institutions would set an effective floor to 
broadly defined money market rates. Likewise, the remuneration on CBDC would 
establish a lower bound for the interest rates on households’ and firms’ deposits. Thus, 
changes in the CBDC rate would affect agents’ spending and saving decisions, either 
directly through the remuneration of funds deposited at the central bank, or indirectly 
through their effect on the remuneration of deposits at commercial banks. In turn, 
changes in banks’ funding costs have a bearing on the interest rates at which banks 
lend to the real economy. In short, the remunerated CBDC scenario would afford the 
central bank greater control over the general financial conditions in the economy and, 
therefore, over aggregate demand. 
Beyond its effects on monetary policy transmission, the pressure that remunerated 
CBDC would exert on the returns on bank deposits might have implications for the 
profitability and size of the banking sector. In the case of a sufficiently low CBDC 
interest rate relative to the rates on bank reserves, banks could offer deposit rates 
above the CBDC rate, thereby avoiding the loss of deposits, and at the same time 
maintain the profitability of its funds. At the opposite extreme, a CBDC interest rate at 
the same level as that on bank reserves would force banks to raise the remuneration on 
their deposits above the CBDC rate. This, in addition to reducing their net interest 
margins, might lead to a reduction in the supply of credit and raise the cost thereof, 
likewise leading in all probability to a contraction in the banking sector’s intermediation 
capacity.
Lastly, even if non-remunerated, the introduction of CBDC might affect financial stability, 
since in the face of a financial crisis central bank money could be perceived as safer than 
the deposits at commercial banks. Accordingly, depositors – especially wholesalers whose 
deposits are not covered by State guarantees – might be tempted to withdraw their funds 
from banks to their accounts in CBDC, thereby fuelling potential bank panic and, therefore, 
exacerbating the financial crisis.17 
Implications for monetary 
policy transmission and 
financial stability 
16  The analysis focuses hereafter on the case of positive interest rates on bank reserves, i.e. once the current 
situation of (slightly) negative interest rates has normalised. The scenario of negative rates (and the possibility 
of introducing CBDC with likewise negative remuneration) poses additional complexities that lie beyond the 
scope of this article.
17  One means of minimising this risk in the case of CBDC remunerated below the rate on reserves would be to 
impose a penalty (negative) CBDC rate in the event of financial crises, to discourage mass fund withdrawals.
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As discussed in this article, one argument that might be considered when assessing the 
introduction of CBDC is that related to the improvement in monetary policy conduct by 
means of a better control of the market returns that savers and borrowers face. Also, the 
possibility of eliminating the restrictions associated with the zero-interest-rate bound is 
theoretically attractive, especially in an environment of low interest rates as at present.18 
However, the attendant uncertainties and risks are significant and oblige central banks to 
be cautious in this respect. 
One initial risk associated with the introduction of CBDC pertains to technology. The case 
of non-anonymous CBDC based on a similar technology to that for the current electronic 
means of payment involves substantial costs in terms of infrastructure and of operating 
requirements and regulatory demands. The case of anonymous CBDC might require 
adapting the cryptocurrency technology to a relatively different environment. A failure in 
either of the two scenarios, whether accidental or further to a cyber-attack, might cause 
considerable harm to the economy as a whole. 
The second risk is that of financial stability. The introduction of a new risk-free asset 
(especially if remunerated) would necessarily affect the profitability of the banking sector 
and might encourage depositors to withdraw funds (assigning them to their current 
accounts at the central bank), particularly during bouts of banking panic, making such 
bouts potentially more likely and intense. A priori, it is difficult to estimate quantitatively the 
effect of these considerations on the stability of the financial sector and on bank lending 
in general, as there is no previous experience. 
Consequently, the most reasonable path for central banks to pursue is a watch-and-wait 
approach, analysing technological progress and its potential applications in the areas 
under their remit and avoiding potential risks to their operating and monetary frameworks.
30.7.2018.
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Cryptocurrencies emerged in 2009 with the creation of Bitcoin. 
Essentially, Bitcoin is a method for individuals to carry out 
transfers without the need for a central entity accrediting the 
movement of funds. That is to say, if individual A wishes to 
transfer funds to B, under conventional transfer arrangements it 
is necessary for an external institution C to accredit the fact that 
A has the funds at the outset of the transaction and that it is B 
who disposes of the funds at the end of the transaction. 
Accordingly, C must maintain in real time a ledger in which it 
records all transactions. Bitcoin introduced a distributed ledger 
algorithm whereby the accounting entries and the validation 
of the transactions are made in real time by the other nodes of 
the Bitcoin network. These nodes perform the aforementioned 
validation through complex mathematical algorithms in 
exchange for which they receive new Bitcoins as compensation, 
in what is known as “Bitcoin mining”. In this way, Bitcoin offers 
an alternative means for mobilising funds among economic 
agents. 
Along with this algorithm, Bitcoin is novel in a second respect. 
Instead of being an algorithm designed to transfer legal-
currency-denominated funds, the amounts to be transferred are 
denominated in the virtual currency itself, the Bitcoin, which has 
no fixed parity with existing legal currencies. Instead, and to 
prevent the need for creating a central entity entrusted with 
issuing Bitcoins, the algorithm only allows the issuance of 
Bitcoins as remuneration for mining activities, at a rate that 
diminishes in proportion to the total volume created. In this 
way, the supply of Bitcoins remains limited and cannot be 
discretionally altered. 
This limited supply of Bitcoins has prompted a progressive 
change in its valuation from its creation as a means of exchange 
to its current situation as an investment product, evidencing high 
price volatility. Investors invest in Bitcoins in the same way that 
they can invest in gold or in diamonds, which are assets with a 
limited supply and not subject to the actions of governments or 
of central banks. That has led to an explosion in the price of 
Bitcoins and to great volatility, as can be seen in Chart 1. Other 
cryptocurrencies, like Ethereum, which have improved on certain 
aspects of Bitcoin, such as validation time maintaining the same 
structure, have also followed a similar price pattern.
CRYPTOCURRENCIES BOX 1
Chart 1
CRYPTOCURRENCY PRICES
SOURCES: Coinmarketcap.com, etherscan.io and ECB.
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